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State v. Lamb: North Carolina Rejects Luce
In Luce v. United States I the United States Supreme Court considered
whether a defendant who declines to testify after a judge refuses to exclude his
criminal convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)2 forfeits his right to
challenge that ruling on appeal. The Court unanimously held that in order to
preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction,
the defendant must testify.3 In State v. Lamb4 the North Carolina Supreme
Court addressed the similar question whether a defendant must testify to pre-
serve appellate review of a judge's refusal to exclude impeachment evidence of
bad acts under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 608(b).5 Disavowing the need
to determine the applicability of Luce,6 the court held that in the rule 608(b)
context, the defendant's testimony is unnecessary to preserve her appellate
right.
7
This Note examines Lamb and the applicability of the Luce rule to Lamb's
facts. It argues that North Carolina has implicitly rejected Luce and its ration-
ale. The Note concludes that the supreme court's decision is sound, although its
opinion offers little guidance to North Carolina appellate courts or to attorneys
debating whether to put their clients on the stand. Finally, this Note offers some
suggestions for dealing with the problem of appellate review of motions in
limine.8
1. 469 U.S. 38 (1984).
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides:
GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punish-
able by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness
was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false state-
ment, regardless of the punishment.
FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
3. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41.
4. 321 N.C. 633, 365 S.E.2d 600 (1988).
5. North Carolina Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his
credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concern-
ing his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect
to matters which relate only to credibility.
N.C. R. EVID. 608(b).
6. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 646, 365 S.E.2d at 607 ("We express no opinion on the applicability of
Luce.").
7. Id. at 649, 365 S.E.2d at 609.
8. A motion in limine is a motion made "loin or at the threshold; at the very beginning;
preliminarily." State v. Tate, 300 N.C. 180, 182, 265 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1980) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979)). This Note uses the term to refer to motions made before or during
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In July 1985 defendant Ruby Lawless Lamb was indicted for the murder of
her husband. In pretrial discovery defendant learned that several of her relatives
had informed police that defendant told them she had participated in four other
murders. Three of the murder victims were Mrs. Lamb's family members. Mrs.
Lamb was never indicted for those killings. Fearing potential damage from this
evidence, defendant filed a pretrial motion in limine to exclude any testimony
relating to Mrs. Lamb's alleged statements about the killings. The trial court
deferred ruling on this motion.9
The trial began without a ruling on defendant's motion. The State did not
attempt to use any evidence of the other killings during its case in chief.t0 Near
the close of defendant's evidence, defendant renewed her motion in limine, and
the judge denied it. Defendant then declined to take the stand to avoid possible
impeachment by the State. She was convicted of second-degree murder and sen-
tenced to fifteen years in prison.1
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial
judge's denial of defendant's motion in limine constituted reversible error.12
The appeals court ruled that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Luce
did not bind North Carolina courts.13 Even if Luce were binding, the court of
appeals stated, Lamb was distinguishable from Luce on two grounds. First, ap-
pellate review of the challenged evidence did not require balancing probative
value against prejudice to the defendant. Second, defendant's intention to testify
trial to exclude prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 40
n.2 (same usage).
9. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 636, 365 S.E.2d at 601. The court noted that the trial judge was correct
to defer his ruling on defendant's pretrial motion. At the time of the motion hearing, the statements
made by defendant's relatives were not before the judge. Therefore, the court had no factual context
in which to make a decision: "The Rules of Evidence are not to be applied in a vacuum; they are to
be applied in a factual context." Id. at 648, 365 S.E.2d at 608. In light of the court's ultimate
holding-that the motion ruling was appealable despite the absence of a reviewable context-this
statement seems ironic. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
10. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 646, 365 S.E.2d at 607. The State contended at the pretrial motion
hearing that the evidence of defendant's statements regarding the other killings would be substan-
tively admissible under North Carolina Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.
N.C. R. EVID. 404(b). The appellate court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under rule
404(b) to prove motive, because there was "not the slightest hint that the three allegedly professed
killings provided a motive for killing David Lamb." Lamb, 84 N.C. App. 569, 584, 353 S.E.2d 857,
865 (1987), aff'd, 321 N.C. 633, 365 S.E.2d 600 (1988). The list of purposes for which evidence can
be admitted, however, is only illustrative. It is at least arguable that evidence of the other killings
would have been substantively admissible to prove a pattern, especially because the victims in three
of the four alleged killings were also family members. See Brief for State at 19, Lamb (No.
8611SC818). The State rendered the question of substantive admissibility moot by not using the
evidence during its case in chief, and the point was not raised on appeal.
11. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 636, 365 S.E.2d at 602.
12. Lamb, 84 N.C. App. at 580, 353 S.E.2d at 863.
13. Id. In the discussion following its dismissal of Luce as non-binding, the court of appeals
pointed out in a footnote: "The North Carolina Rules of Evidence mirror almost completely the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus rulings on the Federal Rules of Evidence are often helpful." Id. at
580 n.3, 353 S.E.2d at 863 n.3.
but for the trial court's ruling was clear from the record. 14 The court reasoned
that the strong policy favoring a witness' right to testify without fear of impeach-
ment by inadmissible evidence outweighed any dangers addressed by Luce and
mandated reviewability in this case. 15 The State renewed its Luce argument in
its petition to the North Carolina Supreme Court. 16
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals. Its opinion in large part
mirrored the reasoning of the court of appeals. The court based its holding on
two factors. First, evidence of violence to others is generally irrelevant to the
issue of a defendant's veracity and therefore is inadmissible as impeachment evi-
dence. 17 Second, defendant's intention to testify but for the denial of her motion
was abundantly clear from the record.18 Because of the high probability that the
challenged evidence was inadmissible and defendant's clear intention to testify if
this evidence was excluded, the supreme court concluded that the trial court
impermissibly chilled defendant's right to testify in her own behalf, entitling her
to a new trial.' 9
The question of appellate review of motions in limine in the absence of
defendant's testimony arises primarily in the context of rule 609(a), when the
issue is the admissibility of defendant's prior convictions for impeachment pur-
poses. Prior to the Luce decision in 1984, opinions in nine federal circuits held
that the accused could obtain review even though he did not testify.20
Luce emphatically rejected this conclusion. In his opinion for a unanimous
court2 ' Chief Justice Burger offered three reasons for the Court's rejection of
appellate review when a defendant does not testify. First, "[a] reviewing court is
handicapped in any effort to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside a fac-
tual context."' 22 Burger observed that this handicap is particularly troublesome
in the rule 609(a) context, where the judge must balance the probative value of a
14. Id. at 581, 353 S.E.2d at 864.
15. Id. at 583, 353 S.E.2d at 865. The court of appeals stated:
If the threatened use of inadmissible evidence can prevent the defendant from testifying
altogether and also deny her the opportunity to appeal an erroneous ruling on the admissi-
bility of the evidence, the State would have multiple opportunities to silence defendants,
and the very purpose of the motion in limine would be lost.
Id.
16. New Brief for State at 5-10, Lamb (No. 136PA87).
17. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 647, 365 S.E.2d at 608.
18. Id. at 648, 365 S.E.2d at 608.
19. Id. at 649, 365 S.E.2d at 609.
20. See United States v. Washington, 746 F.2d 104, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496, 499 n.1 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1069
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc); United States v. Halbert, 668 F.2d 489, 493-94 (10th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1983); United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 352-53 (Ist Cir. 1981); United
States v. Burkhead, 646 F.2d 1283, 1285 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1982); United
States v. Williams, 642 F.2d 136, 140 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523,
528 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980).
21. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the opinion of the Court and concurred in a separate
opinion. Luce, 469 U.S. at 43 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring).
22. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41.
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prior conviction against its prejudicial effect on the defendant.23 Second, "[a]ny
possible harm flowing from a district court's in limine ruling permitting im-
peachment by a prior conviction is wholly speculative."' 24 Harm to the defend-
ant is speculative because (1) the trial judge is not bound by his in limine ruling
and might have changed it during defendant's testimony if it became neces-
sary,25 and (2) the appeals court has no way of knowing if the prosecution would
have used the prior conviction at all.26 Third, if these motion rulings were re-
viewable, "almost any error would result in the windfall of automatic reversal;
the appellate court could not logically term 'harmless' an error that presump-
tively kept the defendant from testifying."' 27 Requiring the defendant to testify
will discourage defense attorneys from "making such motions solely to 'plant'
reversible error in the event of conviction." 28
Justice Brennan limited his concurrence to the nonappealability of in limine
rulings under rule 609(a).29 The lack of a similar limitation in Chief Justice
Burger's opinion opened the door to allow state and federal courts to apply Luce
beyond the rule 609(a) context. Federal circuit courts have applied Luce to
rules 403,30 404(b),3 1 and 608(b).32 State courts have extended Luce to cases
involving impeachment by bad acts33 and prior statements. 34 If any discernible
difference regarding the need for a reviewable factual context on appeal between
motion rulings under rule 609(a) and rulings under other rules exists, the courts
following Luce have failed to point it out.
Two federal cases have held that Luce is applicable to federal 608(b) rul-
ings. 35 In United States v. Weichert36 defendant, a former attorney, had been
disbarred twelve years before his trial for fraud. The trial court denied defend-
ant's motion to exclude his disbarment as impeachment evidence, and defendant
then declined to testify. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that because defend-
23. Id. The same difficulty inherently exists, however, in any appeal lacking a reviewable fac-
tual context, according to the Court. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 41-42.
26. Id. at 42.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 43-44 (Brennan, J., concurring) ('I do not understand the Court to be deciding
broader questions of appealability vel non of in limine rulings that do not involve Rule 609(a).").
Justice Brennan's concern centered not so much on limiting nonappealability to the rule 609(a)
context as on limiting it to cases in which a concrete factual context was necessary for adequate
appellate review. He stated, for example, that he would not favor the nonappealability of an in itnne
ruling admitting immunized testimony for impeachment purposes, because admissibility of such tes-
timony turns on legal, not factual, considerations. Id. at 44 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 105 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 137 (1987).
31. United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985).
32. United States v. Weichert, 783 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986);
United States v. Dimatteo, 759 F.2d 831, 833 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 860 (1985).
33. State v. Wilson, 509 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Chapman, 496
A.2d 297, 302-03 (Me. 1985).
34. People v. Henne, 165 Ill. App. 3d 315, 326, 518 N.E.2d 1276, 1283-84 (1988).
35. Weichert, 783 F.2d at 25; Dimatteo, 759 F.2d at 833.
36. 783 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1985).
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ant failed to testify, he could not appeal the trial court's motion ruling.37 The
court stated that at the heart of Luce's logic lies the inability of an appellate
court to review a trial court's balancing of probative value and prejudice without
reference to the defendant witness' actual testimony.38 That difficulty, accord-
ing to the Weichert court, is no different under rule 608(b): "If impeaching ques-
tions are permitted under Rule 608(b), the trial court is still required to balance
probative value against prejudice under [rule] 403, and this balancing is as de-
pendent on the specific factual context as it is in Rule 609 cases."' 39
In State v. Wilson,4° a case factually similar to Lamb, a Florida court fol-
lowed Luce to deny the defendant's appeal of a motion to exclude evidence of
prior bad acts.41 In that case defendant was on trial for the murder of his
brother-in-law. Defendant moved to exclude evidence of his prior violent acts
which might be used to impeach the testimony of his character witnesses. The
motion was denied. Defendant then elected not to present his character wit-
nesses and appealed the denial of his motion in limine. The Florida court, citing
Luce, held that the motion was unreviewable because the witnesses did not
testify.42
As these cases suggest, acceptance of the reasoning in Luce in the rule
609(a) context leads logically to a similar acceptance in a rule 608(b) context.
The same lack of factual context handicaps the reviewing court in each case, and
balancing probative value against prejudice to the defendant under rule 609(a)
does not differ from the rule 403 balancing necessary to every rule 608(b) deter-
mination. 43 Rule 608(b) rulings also contain the same dangers identified in Luce,
speculative harm to the defendant and the possibility of the defendant's "plant-
ing" reversible error in the event of conviction.
North Carolina rule 608(b) is identical to its federal counterpart. Moreover,
the commentary to North Carolina rule 608(b) includes the portion of the fed-
eral advisory committee's note which states that "the overriding protection of
Rule 403 requires that the probative value not be outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice." 44 Chief Justice Burger referred to exactly this sort of balanc-
ing when he wrote: "To perform this balancing, the court must know the pre-
cise nature of the defendant's testimony, which is unknowable when ... the
defendant does not testify. ' '45 There is, then, no significant distinction between
the types of appellate review at issue in Luce and Lamb.
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id. at 25.
39. Id.
40. 509 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
41. Wilson, 509 So. 2d at 1282.
42. Id.
43. Weichert, 783 F.2d at 25. North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609(a) does not have the bal-
ancing provision of the corresponding federal rule. The omission in no way affects this Note's analy-
sis, however. North Carolina rule 608(b) does provide for balancing implicitly through its inclusion
of rule 403. See N.C. R. EvID. 608(b) commentary. This balancing element is the subject of com-
parison between Lamb, decided under rule 608(b), and Luce, decided under federal rule 609(a).
North Carolina rule 609(a) in no way enters into this comparison.
44. N.C. R. EvID. 608(b) commentary.
45. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984).
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Given the virtually identical difficulties of appellate review in Luce and
Lamb and the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in Lamb permitting ap-
peal from the denial of motions in limine under rule 608(b) in the absence of
defendant's testimony, one may infer that North Carolina has rejected Luce.
The only uncertainty in this conclusion lies in the court's failure to give a clear
indication of the principles it used to determine appealability. Other state courts
that have rejected Luce have either replaced it with procedures to safeguard
against the dangers it addressed 46 or have explained in detail the rationale for
their decision. 47
Further examination of the Lamb opinion demonstrates the confusion it
may create. The court began its discussion by noting that "fu]nder Rule 608(b),
evidence of a specific instance of conduct is not admissible for impeachment
purposes unless it 'is infact probative of truthfulness.' ,'a Evidence of violence
is "routinely disapproved of as irrelevant to the question of a witness'... verac-
ity."'49 Therefore, the court reasoned, "the evidence appears to be inadmissi-
ble."'50 This logic appears unassailable. If a certain type of evidence is
inadmissible to impeach a witness, it seems such evidence should be excluded
regardless of whether the defendant testifies. The court, however, undermined
its own reasoning. Near the end of the opinion, the court speculated on the
possible results if the defendant had testified. The court first pointed out, in
support of its ruling, that had Mrs. Lamb taken the stand and been subjected to
prejudicial cross-examination, the judge could have reversed his denial of her
motion and excluded questions regarding the other alleged killings because the
trial court is free to alter an in limine ruling as the circumstances warrantA1
Chief Justice Burger made this same argument in Luce to demonstrate that any
harm to the defendant would be speculative in the absence of his testimony.52
For this reason, the Lamb court's conclusion that the judge's right to change his
mind contributes to the certainty of appellate review of motions in limine is
difficult to understand. Because the judge may exclude previously admitted im-
peachment evidence during defendant's testimony, it is a matter of conjecture in
the absence of defendant's testimony whether the judge ultimately would have
allowed the State to impeach the defendant. Appellate review, therefore, would
be less certain because of the changeable nature of in limine rulings.
46. E.g., State v. McClure, 298 Or. 336, 341, 692 P.2d 579, 583 (1984) (en banc) (requires
defendant to establish on the record her intent to testify if the challenged evidence is excluded and to
outline her testimony so that the court can do the required balancing); Commonwealth v. Richard-
son, 347 Pa. Super. 564, 571, 500 A.2d 1200, 1204 (1985) (extensive hearing by trial court on mo-
tions to exclude prior convictions). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania procedure for ruling on
motions to exclude prior convictions, see Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 562-67, 307 A.2d
255, 260-63 (1973).
47. E.g., State v. Whitehead, 104 N.J. 353, 360-61, 517 A.2d 373, 376-77 (1986) (Luce concerns
illusory in light of court's experience with appeals of in limine rulings).
48. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 647, 365 S.E.2d at 607 (quoting State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 634, 340
S.E.2d 84, 89 (1986).
49. Id. (quoting State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 635, 340 S.E.2d 84, 90 (1986)).
50. Id. at 647, 365 S.E.2d at 608.
51. Id. at 648, 365 S.E.2d at 608.
52. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42.
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The court further dismantled its reasoning with the doctrine of "opening
the door." The court stated that
had defendant taken the stand and testified that she had never made
such statements or had never been involved in any prior acts of vio-
lence to the person, she would have "opened the door." Although the
statements appeared inadmissible under Rule 608(b); had defendant
thus opened the door, the prosecutor would have been at liberty to use
the statements to impeach defendant.5 3
Not only would the State have been able to impeach the defendant had she
opened the door, but it actually might have been able to put her relatives on the
stand to rebut her testimony.5 4 Taken to their logical conclusion, the court's
statements conceivably suggest that an offhand response on direct examination
such as, "I've never hurt anyone in my life," could give rise to a small parade of
terribly damaging witnesses.
Considering the possibility that defendant could open the door to admission
of the evidence, the court's holding that the impeachment evidence was per se
inadmissible is tenuous. The court itself admitted that the evidence could have
become admissible, but only if defendant had testified. The only conclusion
from the court's reasoning is that, despite its holding otherwise, a reviewing
court simply cannot rule with certainty on the issue of admissibility in the ab-
sence of defendant's testimony.
Lamb lacks the clarity necessary to guide defense lawyers in deciding
whether to put their clients on the stand. On the one hand, the court clearly
favors the appealability of motions in limine absent defendant's testimony. On
the other hand, the court itself recognizes that an appellate court cannot ade-
quately review such a motion ruling without that testimony. The uncertainty of
the opinion is due in part to the court's refusal expressly to adopt or reject Luce.
Had the court adopted Luce, it would have gained a very simple procedure with
proven broad applicability. 5 Rejecting Luce explicitly would have all but
forced the court to develop an alternate rationale, because rejection of the
Supreme Court is not to be taken lightly, even when its decisions are non-bind-
ing.5 6 Without Luce as a point of departure, the court was left to traverse un-
charted ground alone.
53. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 649, 365 S.E.2d at 608-09 (emphasis added).
54. See State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 28, 337 S.E.2d 786, 801 (1985) (quoting State v. Albert, 303
N.C. 173, 177, 277 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1981)) ("Where one party introduces evidence as to a particular
fact or transaction, the other party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal
thereof, even though such latter evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered
initially.").
A statement such as "I've never hurt anyone in my life" arguably is collateral and therefore
does not open the door to extrinsic evidence. Even if the State could not have presented the wit-
nesses themselves, however, it still could have asked the pregnant question: "Didn't you tell your
relatives that you have killed four other people?" See State v. Burgin, 313 N.C. 404, 406, 329 S.E.2d
653, 656 (1985) (quoting Maddox v. Brown, 233 N.C. 519, 524, 64 S.E.2d 864, 867 (1951)) (" 'On
cross-examination much latitude is given counsel in testing for consistency and probability matters
related by a witness on direct examination.' "); 3A J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 1023 (Chadbourn rev.
1970).
55. See supra notes 21 & 30-34 and accompanying text.
56. The truth of this statement can be seen in the opinions of the courts that have expressly
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Despite these problems in Lamb, there is a thread of policy running
through the opinion that indicates the court's posture toward the general appeal-
ability of motions in limine when defendant does not testify. The court empha-
sized the certainty of both defendant's intention to testify and the State's
intention to use the damaging evidence to impeach her.5 7 Moreover, the impor-
tance to defendant of the opportunity to testify was increased by the State's
reliance on the testimony of defendant's relatives,58 which made the case a
swearing contest before the jury. In light of these circumstances, the court held
that "any undue discouragement of defendant's right to take the stand in her
own defense was fraught with prejudice." 59
The court's conclusion that the ruling was "fraught with prejudice" is puz-
zling. Any denial of a defendant's motion to exclude damaging impeachment
evidence inevitably will discourage him in some degree from testifying. Taking
the stand is simply a less attractive proposition when one faces impeachment.
An appellate court should not reverse a trial court's refusal to exclude impeach-
ment evidence merely because the defendant was thereby discouraged from testi-
fying. The court, however, claimed that the trial court's ruling in this case
resulted in "undue discouragement." 6 Why is the discouragement in this case
"undue"? The court gave no answer. The apparent reason is that defendant was
discouraged from testifying by the trial court's erroneous refusal to exclude the
impeachment evidence, thus returning to the question whether an appellate
court can adequately determine error in the absence of defendant's testimony.
Even if the court had framed the issue in terms of undue discouragement of
defendant's right to testify, the case would have turned on the Luce question of
the appealability of motions in limine in the absence of defendant's testimony.
The policy underlying the court's discussion is the high valuation of defend-
ant's right to testify in her own defense and the protection which should be
afforded that right. If the appellate court cannot rule with certainty on the ad-
missibility of impeachment evidence, it nevertheless should be allowed to do so
in order to uphold a criminal defendant's right to testify. The importance of the
criminal defendant's right to testify simply outweighs the need for certainty on
appellate review. In other words, the cost of Luce is a price North Carolina
courts are unwilling to pay. In order to gain certainty on appellate review and
to avoid the risk of automatic reversal on appeal, Luce offers the criminal de-
fendant a Hobson's choice: refrain from testifying and give up the right to ap-
peal one's motion in limine or testify in the teeth of potentially inadmissible
rejected Luce. See, e.g., State v. McClure, 298 Or. 336, 340-41, 692 P.2d 579, 583-84 (1984); State v.
Whitehead, 104 N.J. 353, 360-61, 517 A.2d 373, 376-77 (1986).
57. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 648, 365 S.E.2d at 608 ("[I]t is abundantly clear ... that defendant
intended to testify unless her motion in limine was denied"; "defendant was justified in believing that
if she took the stand" the district attorney would cross-examine her with the impeaching
statements).
58. During the State's case in chief defendant's relatives had testified as to her guilt in the
murder of David Lamb, the victim in this case. Defendant's motion challenged only evidence of
prior killings. Id. at 635, 365 S.E.2d at 601.




impeachment evidence only to preserve the appellate right. Lamb's holding, on
the other hand, protects the defendant from impermissible impeachment and
allows her to testify without fear of such evidence in a new trial.
Lamb's holding favoring a defendant's uninhibited right to testify in her
own defense over the concerns of Luce is sound. Two important considerations
support this conclusion. First, the defendant's testimony on her own behalf is
often crucial to an adequate defense. In Lamb itself the defendant greatly
needed to substantiate her alibi against the conflicting claims of her relatives. 61
Second, North Carolina courts traditionally have held a criminal defendant's
right to testify in high regard. 62 Both the practical need in this case and North
Carolina's concern for a defendant's testimony support Lamb's holding.
Lamb's policy of preserving the defendant's right to testify probably means
that Luce will receive equally unfavorable treatment in North Carolina in the
rule 609(a) context, particularly because North Carolina rule 609(a) lacks the
balancing provision of its corresponding federal rule.6 3 Indeed, the trial judge
has no discretion in ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction under the
North Carolina rule.64 The judge need only plug the offered evidence into the
rule's criteria.65 Because the North Carolina rule requires only a purely legal,
non-factual determination, a reviewing court does not need defendant's testi-
mony in order to determine error.66
Although Lamb's policy of upholding defendant's right to testify is sound,
the decision suggests no procedure to guide future courts in dealing with the
question of appealability of motions in limine when defendant does not testify.
Decisions from other jurisdictions that have rejected Luce may aid North Caro-
lina courts in this respect. In State v. McClure67 the Oregon Supreme Court
61. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 635-36, 365 S.E.2d at 601. Defendant maintained she had been in South
Carolina at the time of her husband's murder.
62. See State v. Bovender, 233 N.C. 683, 689, 65 S.E.2d 323, 329 (1951) (defendant guaranteed
the right to testify in his own behalf); State v. Luker, 65 N.C. App. 644, 650, 310 S.E.2d 63, 66
(1983) (defendant has the right to testify under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion), rey'd on other grounds, 311 N.C. 301, 316 S.E.2d 309 (1984). North Carolina preceded the
United States Supreme Court by over three decades in recognizing defendant's right to testify. Two
years ago the Supreme Court held for the first time that criminal defendants have a right to testify in
their own behalf. See Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2709-10 (1987). That right stemmed from
three sources: (1) the guarantee of due process, (2) the sixth amendment's compulsory process
clause, and (3) the fifth amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. The
Court's holding bolsters the long-standing policy in North Carolina and provides further reason to
reject any procedure impinging on the criminal defendant's right to testify.
63. North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides: "For the purpose of attacking the credi-
bility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than 60 days
confinement shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-
examination or thereafter." N.C. R. EVID. 609(a).
64. Id. ("evidence ... shall be admitted.") (emphasis added).
65. Rule 403 may apply to rule 609(a) determinations. This seems unlikely, however, because
the legislature did not adopt the balancing provision of federal rule 609(a) in a set of rules based on
the Federal Rules of Evidence. North Carolina courts have not ruled on the point.
66. See Luce, 469 U.S. 38, 44 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[In cases] in which the deter-
minative question turns on legal and not factual considerations, a requirement that the defendant
actually testify at trial to preserve the admissibility issue for appeal might not necessarily be
appropriate.").
67. 298 Or. 336, 692 P.2d 579 (1984).
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placed two requirements on the criminal defendant in order to preserve the rec-
ord for appeal. First, the defendant must "establish on the record that he will in
fact take the stand and testify" if the challenged evidence should be excluded. 68
Second, he must "[s]ufficiently outline the nature of his testimony so that the
trial court, and the reviewing court, can do the necessary balancing." 69
The first of these requirements, that defendant commit to testify, assures
the appellate court that defendant actually faced cross-examination with the
challenged evidence on the stand. Without the commitment, the reviewing
court cannot determine whether the error would have been harmless, because
defendant might not have taken the stand with or without the ruling on his
motion in limine. The commitment to testify also ensures that the trial court will
not waste its time rendering merely advisory opinions.70
The requirement of a commitment to testify, however, is not without diffi-
culties. Despite good faith representations by defense counsel, a criminal de-
fendant is always entitled to change his mind about taking the stand, making the
commitment unenforceable.7 1 One court has observed that such an impotent
requirement "merely penalize[s] unsophisticated or ill-advised defendants who
are unaware that they could later decide not to testify." 72
In light of these problems, North Carolina should not require the defendant
to commit to testify. The very fact that the defendant has made a motion to
exclude damaging impeachment evidence should provide enough insurance that
he would have testified if his motion had been granted.73 In spite of the Luce
Court's assertion that "an accused's decision to testify 'seldom turns on the reso-
lution of one factor,' "74 a court's refusal to exclude harmful impeachment evi-
dence presumably is the primary motivating factor in defendant's decision not to
testify. This is especially true in cases like Lamb, when defendant's case is
highly dependent on her ability to present her side of the story without fear of
impeachment. '
A proffer of testimony by the defendant allows the appellate court to bal-
ance probative value and prejudice in a reviewable factual context, the main
concern of the Luce Court.75 The reviewing court then has a record against
68. Id. at 341, 692 P.2d at 583.
69. Id.
70. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 31, at 198 (Supp. 1988).
71. McClure, 298 Or. at 341 n.2, 692 P.2d at 579 n.2; see Luce, 469 U.S. at 42 ("[S]uch a
commitment is virtually risk-free because of the difficulty of enforcing it."); see also United States v.
Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1189 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[A] defendant cannot be bound to a pretrial statement of election; in fact, it would appear to be
unconstitutional to do so."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980).
72. State v. Whitehead, 104 N.J. 353, 360, 517 A.2d 373, 377 (1986).
73. Id. at 360-61, 517 A.2d at 377; see United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1069 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (it is reasonable to presume that advance ruling on admissibility of prior convictions is an
important factor in defendant's decision whether to testify); Cook, 608 F.2d at 1184 n.6 (court noted
that the House Committee on the Judiciary "thought it safe to say, that more defendants will testify
if prior convictions are kept from the jury than if the prior convictions are to be revealed").
74. Luce, 469 U.S. at 42 (quoting New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 467 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)).
75. Id. at 41; see D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 70, at 197.
1394 [Vol. 67
which it can assess the prosecution's need for the evidence and the harm caused
to the defendant. The proffer thereby adds certainty of appellate review and
removes the opportunity for defense counsel to plant error as sought by the Luce
court.
The requirement of a proffer of testimony does, however, raise some
problems. First, as noted in Luce, the defendant's "trial testimony could, for
any number of reasons, differ from the proffer."' 76 This concern is allayed some-
what by the fact that the problem is inherent in any proffer of testimony, not just
those made pursuant to a judge's denial of a motion in limine. Courts routinely
determine error in other contexts from proffers of testimony, 77 and there is no
reason to set apart denials of motions in limine as a special case where the prof-
fer is insufficient. Second, "the nature and scope of the proffer, as well as the
prosecutor's use of defendant's proffered testimony, if he testifies, for impeach-
ment purposes at trial raise thorny questions about the extent to which the state
can cross-examine the defendant and use the defendant's testimony at trial."'78
For example, if the defendant makes the proffer and is subjected to cross-exami-
nation, the question arises: May the prosecutor use the proffered testimony for
impeachment purposes if the defendant's actual testimony before the jury differs
from the proffer?79 No court has yet reached this question. Although these
problems are real, they are not compelling. The proffer may be limited only to
those matters relevant to the challenged evidence, thus reducing the scope of the
matters the prosecution could use against the defendant on cross-examination.
Moreover, the danger of cross-examination with the proffer actually offsets the
first danger, that defendant's actual testimony will differ from the proffer. If the
defendant knows that the prosecution can cross-examine him with inconsistent
statements from his proffer of testimony, he will be careful to keep his actual
testimony similar to the proffer to avoid impeachment.
Third, "requiring the defendant to make an offer of proof exposes him to
the tactical disadvantage of prematurely disclosing his testimony."8 0 Although
a proffer does necessitate premature disclosure, again this is the nature of offers
of proof in general. Further, the prosecution is likely to know much of the sub-
ject matter of the defendant's potential testimony already from the criminal in-
vestigation. The danger of premature disclosure could be further mitigated by
restricting the scope of the proffer to those matters relating to the evidence
sought to be excluded.
While these concerns should not be dismissed lightly, they do not outweigh
the benefits of a proffer of testimony. Although Luce went too far and paid the
price of chilling the criminal defendant's right to testify, its point that a review-
able factual context is needed by the appellate court is well taken. The proffer of
testimony gives the court such a context by putting defendant's testimony in the
76. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 n.2.
77. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 70, § 31, at 198.
78. State v. Whitehead, 104 N.J. 353, 361, 517 A.2d 373, 377 (1986).
79. United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985 (1980).
80. Whitehead, 104 N.J. at 361, 517 A.2d at 377.
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record without forcing him to be subjected to potentially inadmissible impeach-
ment evidence before the jury.
North Carolina should add to its commendable policy favoring a criminal
defendant's right testify the worthwhile procedure of requiring a proffer of testi-
mony from the defendant to preserve the record for appeal. Oregon, for exam-
ple, which does not follow Luce, has found such a procedure helpful in ruling on
motions in limine at both the trial and appellate levels.8' Commentators also
have stated that requiring a proffer, and not defendant's actual testimony, is the
better means of preserving the record. 82 If North Carolina plans to reject Luce,
it should do so by replacing Luce with the proffer of testimony, thus addressing
Luce's concerns without impinging on defendant's right to testify.
Although the Lamb court can be praised for its final holding, the opinion is
confusing. The policy underlying the supreme court's reasoning and much of
the language in the opinion indicate that North Carolina has rejected Luce and
will never require defendant to testify to preserve the record for appeal. How-
ever, the court's unfortunate refusal to take a position on Luce, even though
Luce was presented in the briefs of both parties in the case,83 leaves some room
for uncertainty. One can only hope that in a future case the court will unequivo-
cally reject Luce and put in its place a requirement of a proffer of testimony from
the defendant, thus bringing certainty to the substantive and procedural law on
this point of North Carolina evidence.
CHRISTOPHER T. GRAEBE
81. E.g., State v. McClure, 298 Or. at 336, 340-41, 692 P.2d 579, 583 (1984). In fact, the
Oregon legislature included the proffer of testimony in its commentary to Oregon Rule of Evidence
609(a). See id.
82. Eg., D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 70, at 197-98.
83. See New Brief for the State at 5-10, Lamb (No. 136PA87); Defendant-Appellee's New Brief
at 4348, Lamb (No. 136PA87).
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